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Summary findings
Subsidies funded by Russia's regional governments  * Federal budget transfers are quite distortionary, that
represented about 5.2% of GDP in 1995, almost triple  is, they encourage regional governments to continue
the 2% of GDP in subsidies funded by the federal  subsidy policies and postpone structural reforms. In fact,
government. Regional policies vary greatly, influenced  federal transfers tend to be concentrated in regions with
more by local factors than by the federal government.  the most distortionary policies.
To find out what affects the regional governments'  - Housing receives the lion's share of total regional
propensity to subsidize, Freinkman and Haney examined  subsidies, and there are greater disparities in housing
available data for 1992-95,  asking: How great is the  subsidies than in agricultural subsidies.
variation across regions in the incidence of subsidies, and  * Housing and transportation  subsidies are strongly
what are recent trends in such variation? What are the  counter-equalizing: Households in wealthier regions
relative influences of supply and demand factors in  receive more in housing subsidies and rural populations
shaping the current levels of subsidy? How do federal  have less access to those subsidies, so up to 30% of
budget transfers affect regionally funded subsidies to  regional subsidies are questionable in terms of equity.
local enterprises? To what extent are federal transfers  - Federal transfers have less effect on regional
distortionary, encouraging subsidies and postponing the  subsidies in agriculture, which are influenced more by
liberalization of local markets?  the region's own tax base and its share of rural
Their findings:  population or by such factors as the political influence of
e  Regional wealth and federal budget transfers to  local interest groups.
regional governments are two of the most important  * To accelerate structural reforms, the federal
determinants of regional propensity to subsidize.  government might consider reducing the number of
* Even when regional budgetary wealth is controlled  recipients of federal budget transfers and  changing the
for, depressed regions (those affected most by industrial  rules of allocation of the transfers, in particular by
decline and unemployment) tend to spend less on  introducing conditional transfers linked to increases in
subsidies than regions with more favorable economies.  cost recovery.
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I. Introduction
Macroeconomic analysis suggests that regional budgets in Russia have been becoming a
relatively more important source  of those  budget  subsidies and  transfers  that  remain in  the
economy. While subsidies funded by the federal government were cut dramatically over 1992-95,
those  funded by regional  authorities demonstrated  the opposite trend:  they  increased during
1992-94 and even after a significant drop in 1995, when measured as a percent  of GDP, they
were  still higher than in 1992.  The total  volume of  subsidies' funded by regional budgets in
1995 as estimated amounted to 5.2% of GDP, while the federal government spent less than 2%
of GDP for these purposes.
At the  same time, recent  regional developments in Russia demonstrate the  large and
growing variation in models of economic policy conducted by regional governments. (Lavrov,
1996b; Mau  and  Stupin,  1997; Polishchuk,  1996; TACIS,  1996; Vereshagin,  1996).  In  a
situation  where  the federal  government has  a  limited leverage  on  regional  decision-making,
regional policies are heavily influenced by numerous local factors, which de facto  lead to regional
experimentation with quite different (sometimes contradictory) policies and approaches to  the
reform process.  The incidence of regional  subsidies is  an  important  indicator in  such  an
environment because it could be considered as an informative measure of the policy priorities of
particular regional governments as well as of the speed of the regional reform process in general
(Balcerowicz  and Gelb, 1994; Lavrov, 1996b).
The  primary idea  of  this  paper  was  to  examine inter-regional  variation  in  subsidy
allocation and to  explore the basic determinants of budget subsidies in the  87 regions of the
Russian Federation for which data are available from 1992-95.2 Central to the analysis has been
the attempt to provide some answers to the following three questions:
(i)  How large is the variation across regions in the incidence of subsidies and what are the recent
trends in such variation?
(ii)  What are the relative influences of supply and demand factors in determining the current
levels of subsidization in Russian regions?
(iii)  What is the role of federal budget transfers to regions in determining the existing level of
regionally-funded  transfers to local enterprises?
The last issue has attracted special attention because it is closely related to debates about
evolving patterns of inter-governmental fiscal relations in Russia (Wallich, 1994; Le Houerou,
1994; World Bank,  1995a).  In particular, the present system of federal budget transfers to the
regions suffers from many well-known problems.  It has too  many recipients (Dmitriev, 1996),
In this paper,  the  term  "budget  subsidies  " includes  both  conventional  budget  subsidies  allocated  to finns
and various  budget  transfers  such  as investment  grants  and subsidized  budget  loans granted  to the enterprisc
sector. However,  various  cash  transfers  allocated  among  households  (such  as child allowances)  were  excluded
from the analysis.  "Off-budget  subsidies"  includes  various  explicit  forms  of govermnent  support  such as tax
exemptions  and  transfers  from  extra-budgetary  funds.  The  term  "regional  budgets"  means  consolidated  budgets  of
subjects  of the  Russian  Federation.
2  Chechnya  and  Ingushetia  are  excluded  from  this analysis  due  to the absence  of  data  for  most  variables.3
and because of poor targeting tends to  freeze but not to  reduce the existing inter-regional
inequality  (Khurtsevich,  1996).  While  the major declared  purpose of the federal budget transfers
to regions is widely  determined  equalization  of public  consumption  across the country, there is
growing statistical evidence that this goal has not yet been achieved through the  existing
mechanisms  of transfer allocation.  The variation across regions in per capita after-transfer
budget revenues is not significantly  smaller  than the variation in pre-transfer  revenues, which
means  that transfers  do not help  to reduce  the existing  gap between  wealthy  and poor regions  (Le
Houerou, 1996).
However, aside from the equalization  impact of federal transfers,  there is an important
issue of how the received  funds  are used by the receiving  regions. Federal  transfers  to regions in
Russia  are not conditional  and recipients  are free to spend these funds along the general lines  of
their economic policy, including financing incremental government's interventions in  local
markets through price controls and compensatory  subsidies  and transfers to affected  economic
agents.  Does this actually happen?  To what extent are federal transfers to regions actually
distortive,  i.e. ultimately  encourage  regional  governments  to continue subsidization  policies  and
to postpone  liberalization  of local markets?
The paper provides  an overview  of the general situation  with regionally  funded subsidies
in Russia, including  a discussion  of overall  trends, types of subsidies,  sources of their financing,
and peculiarities  of the  reporting procedures regarding subsidy incidence.  The analysis
presented  in the paper suggests  that the existing  level of subsidy  financing  has become  one of the
major sources  of the current fiscal  pressures  at the regional  level as well as a major barrier  to the
acceleration  of structural reforms.  At the same time, cross-regional  variation in the level of
subsidization  is quite  high and growing,  while  most subsidies  are counter-equalizing  and allocated
through inefficient  channels.  There is a  strong correlation between subsidy incidence and
regional  wealth, and federal transfers  to regional  governments  is another important  determinant
of regional  propensity  to subsidize.
The paper is structured  as follows. The next section  provides  an overview  of the general
trends in regional  subsidy  allocation,  which  is followed  by an analysis  of the quality  and reliability
of the available  data on subsidy  disbursement.  The fourth section  presents  the analysis  of cross-
regional  variation  in the financing  of various subsidies  over 1992-95.  The two sections  following
that  contain the  main statistical results with respect to  the  regression analysis of  factors
determining  cross-regional  variation in the level of subsidization.  The final section offers some
conclusions.
II. Regional  Subsidies:  General  Trends  over 1992-95
Russia  started  transition  with  a higher  level  of govemment  subsidies  to enterprises  than other
countries  of  Eastern  and Central  Europe 3. Since  the beginning  of the reforms,  the federal  government
See Balcerowicz  and Gelb (1994)  and Schaffer  (1995). Further, at the beginning  of transition  the level of
subsidies  in  the  Russian  economy  increased,  reflecting  the  inconsistent  character  of stabilization  efforts.  As  a result,  it4
has made a number of attempts to improve its fiscal and enterprise policies and to impose a hard
budget constraint.  The results of these efforts, however, have been mixed:  on the one hand, the
government succeeded in drastically cutting explicit federal subsidies to  enterprises;  most of the
previously  off-budget forms of support were incorporated into the general budget, thus making the
process more transparent. On the other hand, these positive steps were at least partially  offset by an
increase in regional  transfers as well as by the failure to control distortive  tax benefits  and to maintain
tax discipline  (World Bank, 1996;  Alfandari  et al., 1996).
Macroeconomic analysis suggests that regional budgets in Russia have been becoming a
relatively more important source of remaining fiscal subsidies and transfers.  While subsidies
funded by the federal government were cut dramatically over 1992-95, those funded by regional
authorities demonstrated the opposite trend, increasing during 1992-94.  Even after a significant
drop in 1995, when measured as a percent of GDP they were still higher than in 1992.
Table 1. Federal and Regional Budget Subsidies in Russia, 1992-95, as percent of GDP.
1992  1993  1994  1995
Total regional budget subsidies  3.38  5.53  6.19  5.23
Total federal budget subsidies  41.48  10.74  5.79  2.17
Source:  World  Bank  (1996a),  Alfandari  et al. (1996),  other  World  Bank  estimates.
Regional governments expanded their subsidy financing from 3.4%  of GDP in 1992 to
6.2%  in  1994 and to  about 5.2% in  1995 (Table  1).  While in  1992 regional subsidies were
equivalent to only 8% of those funded by the federal government, in 1995 regional subsidies were
2.5 times larger than federal subsidies. To a large extent, this increase took place in response to
the federal government's withdrawal from funding consumer subsidies as well as in reaction to the
implementation of the federal policy of cutting traditional consumer subsidies in housing and
public transportation which had  been provided through  cross-subsidization and implicit price
control.  The increase in real domestic energy prices over  1993-95 brought  about additional
increases in the real costs of housing and public transportation (through gasoline prices), which,
not  being accompanied by adequate increases in cost  recovery, caused additional demand for
regional subsidies.
At  least  a  part  of  the  overall  increase  in  regional  subsidies was  indirectly funded,
especially in 1993-94, by the federal government both through an increase in its transfers to the
regions and changes in tax-sharing arrangements (Table 2).  The growth in federal transfers to the
regions from 1.75% of GDP in 1992 to 2.74% and 3.84% of GDP in 1993 and 1994 respectively
was accompanied by the growth in regional subsidies from 3.4% of GDP in  1992 to  6.2% of
GDP in  1994.  It is worth  mentioning that in  1995, when actually disbursed federal transfers
came down to  1.82% of GDP due to a high accumulation of federal budget arrears to  regions,
regional subsidies also decreased.  As shown below, cross-regional analysis confirms a positive
took  Russia  four years  to cut the share  of subsidies  in GDP to the same  level that  was achieved  within  the fust one or
two  years  of transformation  in  countries  such  as the Czech  Republic  and  Poland.5
correlation  between federal budget  transfers to regions and the volume of the regional budget
transfers  to local enterprises.
Table  2. Inter-government  Budget  Arrangements  in Russia and Regional  Budget  Expenditure  on
Subsidy  Programs,  1992-95
1992  1993  1994  1995
Regional  budget expenditure  as % of  34.02  46.07  42.90  43.66
consolidated  budget  expenditure
Regional  budget subsidies  as % of total  26.03  32.51  33.92  35.99
regional  expenditures
Overall  regional  governments'  expenditures  on 3.4  5.5  6.2  5.2
subsidy  programs,  as % of GDP
Federal  government  budget  transfers  to  1.75  2.70  3.84  1.82
regions,  as % of GDP
Source:  the World  Bank
Total subsidies amounted to 36% of the regional budget expenditures. 4 This is clearly an
unsustainable level of subsidy financing.  The remaining subsidies comprise the largest  single
source of the current crisis in regional finance. In addition, such a large degree of subsidization is
highly distortive.  By  depressing prices  in  housing,  agriculture,  and  transportation,  regional
governments depress corresponding market activities, which leads to large efficiency losses.
Housing, agriculture and public transportation are the sectors which received the largest
amounts of subsidies explicitly fumded  by regional governments from their budgets  (Table 3).
Housing subsidies amounted to  about 4% of GDP in 1994 and to  more than 3.1% of GDP in
1995. They constituted on average 60-65% of the overall budgeted subsidies in  1993-95. The
share of agriculture amounted to  15% of the total,  and the share of transportation  was 7-8%.
While steadily increasing since 1994, cost recovery in housing is still on average at the level of
30-35% of actual costs, while average cost  recovery in public transportation seems to  be less
than 50%.
4  This in fact  underestimates  the actual  volume  of regional  subsidizes  because  it does  not include  budget
arrears  to municipal  utilities,  housing  maintenance  organizations,  as well as to other providers  of subsidized
goods. For instance,  by the end of 1994 six cities participating  in the World  Bank  Housing  Divestiture  Project
accumulated  in their  budget  arrears  to local  utilities  and housing  maintenance  enterprises  on average  about  50%
of their funded expenditures  on housing subsidies (World Bank, 1996b).  The case study of North Caucasus
Railway  reveals that the actual disbursed  subsidies  amounted  to only 11  % of the actual losses of the railway from
commuter  transportation,  which were supposed  to be fully financed  by the regional  administrations.6
Table 3.  Subsidies Financed.from the Russian Regional Budgets, 1992-95, as % of GDP
1992  1993  1994  1995
TOTAL  3.38  5.53  6.19  5.23
A.  Transfers to the enterprise  1.25  1.43  1.27  0.86
sector
Al.Budget  subsidies  1.05  0.84  0.64  0.68
- Agriculture  1.05  0.78  0.60  0.68
- Others  n.a.  0.06  0.04  n.a.
A2. Budget Investment Grants  n.a.  0.29  0.27  0.18
- Agriculture  n.a.  0.29  0.27  0.18
A3. Budget Loans  0.20  0.30  0.35  0.49
B. Indirect subsidies to households  2.13  4.10  4.92  3.89
B1.Budget subsidies  2.13  4.05  4.87  3.80
- Housing & utilities  1.32  3.31  4.17  3.16
- Public Transportation  0.42  0.54  0.34  0.63
- Consumer goods price subsidies  0.39  0.20  0.36  n.a.
B2. Budget Investment Grants  n.a.  0.05  0.05  0.09
- Public Transportation  n.a.  0.05  0.05  0.09
Memo: Tax arrears and deferrals, annual flows n.a.  0.76  0.74  1.14
Source:  The World  Bank
While regional transfers are mainly targeted at compensating producers affected by locally
imposed price controls, there  is  some  evidence that  enterprises outside  of the three  sectors
mentioned above also frequently benefit from regional govermment support.  However, these
kinds of transfers are quite badly documented.  Despite the growing role of regionally funded
subsidies, there are no reliable public finance statistics to clarify the structure of local spending on
the enterprise sector.  The growing share of regional subsidies to enterprises is either reflected in
the budget items 'loans" and 'bthers" or provided from outside of the regional budget altogether.
The latter includes transfers from regional extrabudgetary funds 5, various local tax benefits, and
5  Serova  and Melyukhina  (1995)  describe  the Ulyanovsk  model  of extensive  regional  government  price
control  and  food  rationing.  The  distinctive  feature  of the  model  is the existence  of an informal  agreement  between
local enterprises  and the administration  to comply  with regional  price and trade controls and provide  transfers  to
the regional  extrabudgetary  fumd  used primarily  for price subsidization.7
benefits provided through preferential utility prices and rates of asset lease, etc. 6 It is estimated
from data of the State Tax Service that regional governments provided more than 1% of GDP in
tax exemptions in 1995, which constitute about 20% of their funded budget subsidies (Table 3).
In Tatarstan, which is probably an extreme case of regional government intervention, a case study
revealed that  in  1995 off-budget subsidies, i.e. the  most  implicit part  of the  overall subsidy
program, exceeded  50% of those which were reflected in the budget (Table 4)7.
Table 4.  Tatarstan: various subsidies in 1995.
In trln. rbl.  As % of total
Subsidies from the regional  3.65  64.83
budget,  o/w:
-consumer  1.95  34.64
-producer  1.70  30.20
Subsidies to enterprises from regional  1.65  29.31
extrabudgetary funds
Tax benefits granted to local enterprises  0.33  5.86
TOTAL  5.63  100.00
Source:  the  World  Bank
In addition, a number of case studies suggest that the regional allocation of transfers to
industrial  enterprises  is  biased towards  regionally dominating "crisis"  industries  and  strong
sectoral  interest  groups.  For  example, in  Kemerovo  oblast  subsidies for  the  regional  coal
company Oblkemerovougol  amounted  to  6.6%  of  all expenditures  in the  1996 draft  oblast
budget, and budgeted subsidies per ton of coal produced were higher than the average per ton
federal  coal subsidies  provided  by the  federal budget  (Bodnar  et al., 1996).  Correspondingly,  there  is
evidence that  some  regions  in  Central Russia,  depending  on  peculiarities of  their  industrial
structure, provide relatively more in budget  support  for local textile industry (Cherniavski  and
Smimov,  1994) and defense enterprises (Freinkman  and Titov, 1994). At  the  same time,  regional
governments disburse very little in strategic subsidies which would be targeted at sectors with
long-term  comparative advantages and,  in particular, there  is no  significant support  for new
private entry (Alfandari et al., 1996; Halligan et al., 1996).
All types  of regional subsidies presented  in this paper can be  divided into two  major
groups.  Most regional subsidies (on average about 80% of the total) are consumer focused, that
6  A relatively  new tendency  in this area is the introduction  of various import restrictions,  including a
special  sale tax on goods imported  from other regions, in order to help local producers  (Lavrov, 1996b).  This kind
of off-budget  subsidies  is funded  through  an implicit  taxation of final consumers.
7  Halligan et al. (1996) provided detailed estimates  for tax benefits granted by regional govermnents  in
Yaroslavl  and Novgorod  oblasts  and found substantial  inter-regional  variation.8
is, they are designed to have the local population as their major beneficiary. Producer subsidies,
benefits from which supposed to remain mainly with their recipients in the enterprise sector, are
less important. However,  consumer subsidies in Russia are not  disbursed directly to  the final
consumers  of  subsidized goods  and  services 8 but  instead,  to  local  enterprises  involved  in
provision of  these goods and services.  Consumer subsidies (in housing and transportation, as
well as food subsidies) are received by regional companies (e.g., housing maintenance firms, bus
companies, food  processing  plants)  mainly as  compensation  for  regionally introduced  price
controls over their products and services sold to households.  This manner of allocating subsidies
is very distortive: it actually shifts an essential portion of a nominal subsidy value from consumers
to producers because it does not set the right incentives either for rationalization of consumption
by households or for productivity growth by producers.  In addition, such instruments of subsidy
9 provision do not allow effective targeting and therefore are counter-equalizing9.
The allocation of housing subsidies by regional governments may be considered a  typical
example  of such a distortive institutional  setting. There are two main recipients  of housing subsidies:
local utilities and local housing maintenance  companies (World Bank,  1996b).  The former receive
subsidies primarily  for purchases of fuel, including accumulation of seasonal inventories, and for
capital  repair. The latter are subsidized  mainly  to cover differences  in tariffs  for heat provided  by local
utilities  as well as for general maintenance  and repair of the housing stock. In addition, a substantial
part of subsidies  remains  implicit  because they are still  funded through cross-subsidization  of electricity
and network gas tariffs. Subsidies  related to financing of provision of heat and hot water to tenants
prevail in the overall budget expenditure  on housing,  which amounts  to 60-65% of the total budgeted
subsidies. The inefficient  system of subsidy  allocation combined with the lack of metering of utility
services and with  poor  corporate governance and regulation of  utility companies lead to  the
accumulation  of enornous efficiency  losses in the housing sector.  Energy consumption in a typical
Russian apartnent building is 2-3 times higher than in market economies with comparable climatic
conditions (Martinot,  1997). Wealthier households tend to have larger apartments and, thus, receive
more in housing subsidies.
m.  Comments on the Data:  Peculiarities of Major Indicators, Availability, Sources
The Russian budget  reporting  system  does not  provide  statistically accurate  data  on
budgeted subsidies as a part of the overall budget spending.  The budget classification in use
before  1995 was based on principles quite different from  those  since put  in place.  The old
classification was basically  the traditional Soviet classification with small modifications and it was
focused on the aggregated sectoral breakdown of total expenditures.  And the data on regional
spending collected by the federal Ministry of Finance did not  provide sufficient information to
build a detailed functional classification of budget expenditure (Freinkman and Titov, 1994).  The
new budget classification introduced in 1995 is based on internationally recognized principles,
and, when fully implemented, will fill this informational gap. However, at the time this paper was
8  Through  cash  allowance  or food  stamp  types  of instruments.
9  In particular,  actual  beneficiaries  of livestock  subsidies  are  firms  in procurement  and meat  processing  but
not  livestock  producers  (Serova  and  Melyukhina,  1995).9
being prepared, only preliminary data on the 1995 budget execution were  available, and these
were also not sufficiently  detailed.
Thus, instead of precise data on regional budget spending on subsidies, the paper utilizes
the available broad measures of subsidy incidence which characterize important components of
the  total  subsidy expenditure but  still do  not  provide comprehensive  coverage  of  the total
regional spending on these purposes.  Three primary budget items were used as broad measures:
national economy expenditures (the major, most informative indicator); total  investments; and
budget loans.  National economy expenditures, as defined by the Russian budget classification in
1992-94, were expenditures on agriculture, housing, transportation, and other sectors (including
food price subsidies 10). While far from perfect, all of these indicators are still informative enough
to reflect both major trends in regional fiscal policies and the scale of market distortions imposed
by the  provision of  subsidies.  The  selection of these  indicators  should be  considered  as  a
reasonable compromise between a demand for more accurate measurement of fiscal processes
and actual constraints associated with the undeveloped state of the Russian fiscal statistics.
The major potential distortions deriving from the analysis of these "imperfect" indicators
are the following:
(i)  While most  of  the  budget  spending reported  under  the  heading 'hational  economy"
represented  in  fact various  subsidies and  transfers  to  corresponding  sectors  of  the  regional
economy, some portion of the actual expenditures under this  heading could have a  different
functional purpose.  The most important example is probably spending on housing, which covers
both housing subsidies (the dominant item) and expenditures on urban development (up to  15%
of the total housing expenditures).  Similarly, expenditures on agriculture include some relatively
small amounts  spent  on  administration and  provision  of  public services to  this  sector  (e.g.
veterinary services).  While by our  estimates 80-85% of the total  subsidized loans  funded by
regional governments were granted to local enterprises, the remaining part was allocated among
non-commercial entities (such as universities) and therefore cannot be treated as a subsidy. Such
non-subsidy  components  of  predominantly  subsidy-type  expenditures  may  vary  in  their
significance across the regions, which could bring about biases in statistical results.'1
(ii)  At the same time, a portion of the overall subsidies funded by regional governments is not
covered by available indicators and therefore is not reflected in this study.  This is caused, first,
by the fact that some newly established, less transparent forms of government financial assistance
to  enterprises and  households are not  reflected under  the  item 'hational  economy" and  are
included  in  the  category  'bther  expenditures"  which  in  1994,  the  last  year  of  the  old
classification, increased to  8.4% of total regional budget spending.  For instance, there is some
'°  Major  subsidized  commodities  are  bread,  milk  and  meat.
1  1  In particular,  'Total  investments"  is the least  reliable  measure  selected  in our study  because  it combines
all types  of budget  investments  -- public  and quasi-public  investments  (local  infrastructure,  housing,  social  assets)
and investment  grants  to commercial  entities. It is known  that the former  is substantially  larger  than the latter
and that investment  grants  outside  the agricultural  sector  have  been  relatively  small  recently. It was  decided  to
keep  this indicator  in the study  basically  for comparative  purposes,  i.e. in order  to figure  out how,  if at all, the
determinants  of subsidies  and investments  differ.10
evidence that short-term budget loans to local enterprises were partially reflected in 1993-94 as
'bther  expenditures" instead of being reported  as 'loans"  Second, and even more importantly,
some remaining forms of government  assistance are  deliberately excluded from  the  regional
budget  documents.  The  main types  of  these  off-budget transfers  are  spending from  extra-
budgetary funds and various tax benefits, granted by local authorities' 2. In addition, as mentioned
earlier,  the Russian budget data are reported on a cash basis, and therefore do not reflect the
volume  of  accumulated government  payables to  local  producers  with  regard  to  budgeted
subsidies.  The existing budget statistics provide neither data on accrual budget expenditure nor
separate information on the accumulated stock of budget arrears.
(iii)  An additional caveat  regarding the  data  has to  do  with  peculiarities of the  Russian
reporting on the federal budget transfers to  regions.  The existing reporting system reflects only
conventional budget transfers and does not  capture various regional benefits allocated through
the preferential tax agreements between some of the regions and the Federal Government.  As the
case  of  Tatarstan  shows,  a  few  regions,  which  enjoyed  a  special fiscal  regime  within the
federation, received most of their federal support through such off-budget channels.
All budgetary  data  used  in  this  paper were  taken  from Russian  Ministry of Finance
sources.  For all years  data were  deflated by  regional CPIs to  remove the  influence of the
variation in price levels in the different regions of Russia.  Note,  however, that some variation
was already present in the regional price levels by 1991.  The absence of a suitable deflator for
this year makes it impossible to correct for this variation.  But the fact that price controls were,
by and large, still in effect in 1991 heavily restricted price variation and renders this a good base
year.13
In 1995, after the introduction of new budget classifications,  the term 'hational economy"
was no longer in Russian Ministry of Finance usage.  The term is used in this analysis in relation
to  1995 for  purposes  of  convenience and  comparability to  earlier years,  and  the  'hational
economy" indicator  for 1995 was created from reported expenditures on agriculture and fishing
('Agriculture');  housing  ('Housing');  industry,  energy  and  construction  (industry');  and
transportation, roads, communications and telecommunications ("Transportation").
A similar reclassification was done regarding the total regional budget revenues in 1995.
To render this indicator comparable with those for the previous years, it was determined as the
sum of pre-transfer (i.e. own) budget revenues of regional governments and the total  federal
transfers received. Thus, it should be noted that 1995 data are not fully comparable with those for
previous years because of the different budget classifications. 
14
12  And  wealthier  regions  tend  to have  larger  off-budget  spending  on  subsidies  and transfers  (Freinkman
and Titov, 1994). See  also Table  4 in the previous  section.
13  However,  already  in 1991  a few regions in the Far North were characterized  by both a much higher price
level and  higher nominal wages. There are no data available  to eliminate  biases  associated  with such 1991  price
differences. But the total effect of these initial distortions  seems to be limited, especially  in later years when
accumulated  price changes eroded  the initial price  variation  across  regions.
14  In addition, because the new budget classification  was in use in  1995 for the first time, there was
probably  additional  noise in the data resulting  from various mistakes  associated  with misclassification.11
In this paper total federal budget transfers to regions were defined as the sum of mutual
settlements, subventions, short-term  loans, and  budget loans  received by the  regions  (World
Bank, 1995a).  Additionally, in 1994 and 1995, grants received by the regions under the Federal
Fund for the Support of the Regions (created in 1994) were included.  At the very least, mutual
settlements were received by all regions and thus, total transfer data exist for all regions in all
years.'5
All information on  non-fiscal indicators derive from various  Goskomstat  publications.
Many of them are the same used by Kitty Stewart in her  study (Stewart,  1996), who kindly
provided us with  access to  her  data base.  Data for  the autonomous regions,  which are the
smallest administrative units  in  terms  of  population,  are not  available in  the  case  of  some
variables, and for this reason sample sizes of 77 and 78 instead of 87 will be noted in some
regressions.  No significant differences in statistical results  associated with the change in the
sample size were found.
In the  regressions for  each year, variables from  that  year are used,  unless otherwise
indicated.  In 1995, a number of social and demographic variables from  1994 were used in the
absence of these data for 1995; but these would not have changed appreciably from one year to
the  next.  The estimates for real household  incomes for  1995 were  calculated based  on  the
nominal mid-year data, while for other years average annual nominal incomes were used.
Factors used in the analysis
Our  analysis was  focused  on  the  identification of  determinants  of  overall  national
economy expenditures as well as the components of those expenditures.  In all, a total of twenty-
four unique (that is, not  counting twice the same type of data for different years) independent
variables were  examined as potential subsidy determinants in the  regression analysis.  These
variables represent both supply-side factors characterizing the availability  of financial resources in
regions which potentially might be spent on subsidization, and demand, or "need" factors.  16
The analysis below is based on the following descriptive model of the subsidy allocation
process. Regional governments allocate subsidies according to signals and pressures exercised by
local interest groups and taking into account their overall budget constraints.  Our demand-side
factors listed below reflect various aspects of regional intensity of the economic crisis.  In other
words, it is assumed that these indicators measure, first, to what extent local economic agents are
affected by current econornic and social difficulties (i.e. how strong is their need for help?) and,
second,  how intensively they pressure regional governments for budget support (i.e. how strong
'5  The  only  exception  is Bashkortostan,  which  did not  report  receiving  any  transfers  in 1995.
16  Note  that  our definition  of demand-side  factors  is different  from  the traditional  approach  used  in political
science, in particular, for analysis of inter-governmental  fiscal relations (Stein, 1981). In such an approach,
supply-side  factors  are primarily  the objectives  of the agency  (e.g. the Central Government)  allocating funds. At
the same  time, our definition  of demand-side  factors  as characteristics  of recipients'  need is quite traditional.12
are their demands for subsidies?).  Regional governments respond to these demands based on (i)
intensity of these pressures; (ii) the structure of their own preferences; and (iii) their own access
to fiscal resources (budget constraints of regional governments).  Our supply-side factors reflect
various aspects of regional economic wealth, and therefore seems could be used as a measure of
budget constraint hardness.
The variables are listed below by type. Unless otherwise noted,  all ruble-denominated
indicators used in the regressions were per capita in 1991 prices.
Supply-side factors
Economic variables
1. Pre-transfer budget revenue
2.  Federal budget transfers
of which: 3.  Mutual settlements
4.  Subventions
5. Federal Fund for Regional Support (in 1994-95)
Social variables
6.  Household gross money income
7.  Doctors per 10,000 population
8.  Hospital beds per 10,000 population
9.  Car ownership (cars per 1,000 population)
Demand-side factors
Economic variables
10. Wage-arrears per worker (end of 1993 data used in 1993-95 regressions)
11.  Index of real industrial output (as % of 1990 level)
12. Loss-making enterprises (% of registered enterprises in major sectors, 1994 data only)
13. Loss-making enterprises in industry (% of registered enterprises in industry, 1994 data only)
14. Unemployment level (registered unemployed as % of labor force)
15. Percentage  of national  income  obtaining  to industry  (1992 data only)
16. Index  of meat production  (proxy  for overall  decline  in the agricultural  sector, as % of 1991
level)
Social and other non-monetary variables
17. Life expectancy (years)
18.  School children per 1,000 population13
19. Population of retirement age (% of population, 1993data only)
20.  Poverty headcount (% of population below regional poverty level, 1994 data only)
21.  Crime rate (registered criminal offenses per 100,000 population)
22.  Population density (1,000 population per square kilometer, 1994 data only)
23.  Percent of total population living in rural locations (1994 data only)
24.  Percent of industrial workers working in poor working conditions (1994 data only)
This list of potential determinants is far from complete.  In particular, we did not have
access to  and so did not  use two  important groups of indicators which reflect variation: the
regional political environment and the impact of economic geography factors such as location17.
This may be an important area for further research, which could explore, for instance, the links
between the regional expenditure policy and local political dynamics. Over the years of reforms,
Russia became quite politically heterogeneous  with  remarkable  spatial variation in  electoral
preferences (Clem and Craumer, 1995; Gambaryan and Mau, 1997). Lavrov (1996a) provides an
analysis of another important dimension of regional political setting -- the degree of centralization
within regional  budget  systems.  He  found  a  positive correlation  between the  incidence of
regional subsidies and the degree of centralization of regional finance in the hands of regional
governments (as  opposed  to  municipal and  rayon  governments).  This  phenomenon has  a
straightforward interpretation.  Social and other basic public expenditures are funded in Russia
mainly from local budgets (i.e. by municipal and rayon governments).  Regional (i.e. provincial)
budget expenditures are mainly focused on dealing with issues of special priority and regional
importance.  In the Russian political context, this often means the provision of budget support to
major  regional enterprises  or  to  the  most  influential local interest  groups,  i.e. allocation  of
subsidies in the general sense.  When more funds are concentrated at the regional level (i.e. the
consolidated regional budget is more centralized), then, all other  factors equal, the  share  of
subsidies in total expenditures goes up."
IV.  Major Trends in National Economy Expenditure of Regional Budgets
A look  at the dynamic processes in budgetary revenues and expenditures in the years
1992-95 as well as some other variables will set the stage for the regression analysis of the data.
Table 5 shows trends in average per  capita national economy spending and per  capita
total expenditures of regional budgets.  Both categories (the former a subset of the latter) peaked
in 1993, after which both declined in 1994 and 1995, for a total decline over the period 1992-95
of  15-18%.  The decline from the peak year,  1993, to the low year, 1995, was 32% for both
national economy and total  expenditures.  As  a percentage  of  total  expenditures,  per  capita
national economy expenditures have held steady at about 42-44%.
17  Polishchuk (1996) suggests that  economic geography is  an  important determinant of  regional
govermnents'  attitude  to the reform  process.
is  This finding seems  to be consistent  with international  experience.  Thus, Davoodi  and Zou (1996) found
that in developing  countries fiscal decentralization  has a positive impact on economic  growth when it brought
about as a result of smaller state (provincial)  government  and larger local government.14
This decline in real spending should not be misinterpreted.  It is estimated that Russian
GDP dropped by 40% over  1991-1995.  Thus,  when measured as a percent of GDP, regional
budget expenditures in 1995 were still above their 1991 level.  And given the much higher rate of
decline in federal budget expenditures,  it is worth noting that in 1995 Russian regions controlled
a  higher  share  of  the  consolidated  budget  than  in  1992,  which  reflects  a  dramatic  fiscal
decentralization in Russia that took place over 1991-1994 (World Bank, 1995a).'9
The individual components of the national economy expenditures show widely varying
trends over time.  Food subsidies (never a large percentage of the total) were given by fewer and
fewer regions from one year to the next, and for 1995 no food subsidy data were reported in the
budget.  The single largest category of expenditure, housing, dropped by 24%, that is, less than
overall national economy expenditures in the period 1993-95 (thus, from  1993 to  1995 housing
expenditures as a  percentage of national economy expenditures increased from 56% to  62%.)
The 34% decline in agricultural subsidies from 1993-95 matched the decline in overall national
economy expenditures in that period, while transportation rose slightly from 1993 to  1995 (albeit
with a dip in 1994), and the category 'bther'  representing mainly subsidies to industry, energy
and construction, declined by 59% from 1993 to  1995 (recall, however, the qualification to the
comparability  of 1993 and 1994 data with those of 1995.)
Per capita investment in the Russian Federation dropped on average by 33% in real terms
over  the  period  1992-1995, while loans  to  enterprises  remained basically unchanged,  while
constituting a relatively small part of overall expenditures.
The relative declines in per capita total budget revenue were greater than for total budget
expenditures. As a result, the regional budget  surplus, which was quite large in  1992, almost
disappeared.  From 1992-95, pre-transfer revenue dropped by about 27% on average across the
country, and average transfers declined by 28%.  Transfers dropped by 2.3 times in 1995 after
three years of growth.
The only non-budgetary category shown in Table 5, household income, is also the only
category that has steadily grown in real terms from one year to the next, rising by 48% from 1992
to  199520,  which reflects the gradual recovery of household incomes after their dramatic decline
in 1992 following price liberalization.
19  In fact that trend stopped  in 1995,  when the relative share of local budgets dropped compared  to 1994
mainly  due to a drastic decline  in federal  transfers  to the regions. See  also Table 2 in the previous  section.
20  There are some inconsistencies  between reported  trends in household  incomes  in Table 1 and those in
traditional statistical  reports  by Goskomstat.  The difference  is the largest for the change  from 1992  to 1993. Table
5 suggests  that real incomes  increased  by 22% while regular Goskomstat  publications  report a 10% increase. This
difference  should  be attributed  to some inconsistencies  between  Goskomstat's  reports  on regional  CPI and regional
nominal incomes and their aggregate national equivalents,  which reflects general weaknesses  of the existing
Russia income statistics  and underlying  household  surveys  (World  Bank, 1995b)15
Table 5. Per Capita Regional Budget Expenditures and Revenues, and Per Capita Household
Incomes  1992-95, in 1991 Rubles (Weighted by Regional Population Averages for  the Russian
Federation). All Variables Deflated By Annual Regional CPIs
1992  1993  1994  1995
L Total budget  1,171  1,402  1,347  959
expenditures
- National economy  502  623  563  425
Housing  --  346  364  262
Agriculture  --  96  84  63
Transportation  --  55  40  54
Other (93/94)/Industry  --  113  73  45
(95)
Food  39  17  5  --
National economy as % of
total expenditures  43  44  42  44
- Total Investment  189  226  186  139
as % of total expenditures  16  16  14  14
- Budget loans*  38  47  32  38
as % of total expenditures  3  3  2  4
II. Total budget revenue**  1,379  1,510  1,418  1,004
- Pre-transfer revenue  1,212  1,286  1,131  884
- Federal transfers  168  220  276  121
m. Household gross money  3,443  4,190  4,644  5,096
incomes
*  For budget loans, reported  data from the regions are likely to be incomplete,  with data for more and more
regions reported  each  year.
** In 1993 and 1994  total revenue  as reported  here is slightly higher than the sum of pre-transfer  revenue and
federal  transfers  because  the calculation  for transfers  did not include some minor items (such  as commercial  bank
loans)  that are captured  in the total revenue.
The data also give a sense of the relative size of Russian regional budgets compared to
monetary incomes of the Russian population.  In per capita terms, regional governments spent in
1992-93 the equivalent of one third of per capita household income.  This ratio fell to one fifth by
1995 due to the simultaneous recovery in personal incomes and the squeeze in regional budgets.
The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation relative to the mean) was used as an
indicator of the degree of the cross-regional variability in the variables (Table 6).16
Table 6. Coefficients of Variation  for Selected Variables
1992  1993  1994  1995
I. Total budget expenditures  .80  .68  .99  .94
- National  economy  .86  .65  1.10  1.09
expenditures
Housing  --  .99  1.39  1.14
Agriculture  --  .67  .61  .71
Transportation  --  .69  .92  .90
Other (93/94)/Industry  (95)  --  .71  1.33  2.84
Food  .91  1.37  2.47  n.a.
- Total  investment  .92  .75  1.21  1.51
- Budget  loans  1.64  1.34  2.68  4.16
H. Total budget revenue  .97  .67  1.02  .98
- Pre-transfer  revenue  .94  .76  .97  1.08
- Transfers  2.20  1.60  1.90  1.91
III. Household incomes  .54  .51  .57  .73
"--m means  data are not available  for these categories  in 1992. "n.a." means not applicable.
Table  6  shows  a  growing  disparity  across  regions  in  per  capita  national  economy
expenditures.  This means that the overall decline in these expenditures seen in Table 5 is not
tending to equalize differences between regions.  On the contrary, the decline has led to greater
inequality.  This tendency is also evident in total expenditures but to a lesser degree, suggesting
the  greater  sensitivity to  changes in  a  region's  overall fiscal  situation  of  national economy
expenditures  within overall expenditures.
Table 6 presents  results complementary to  those  observed in  earlier studies (Stewart,
1995; Rutkowski,  1996):  as a rule,  budget  social expenditures  by Russian  regions  are  much  less
elastic than expenditures on national economy. 2 '  Budget  social spending (including those  on
health  and  education)  are treated  as priority  items  and  are  more  protected  against  various  fiscal
strains,  while  spending  on national  economy  are treated  as 'less  important"  goods,  with  the  real
level of spending  being more  flexible in response  to  changes  in the local budget  situation.
Of  note  in Table  6 is the  high  degree  of variability  over  the  period  in the  coefficients  of
variation  of national  economy  expenditures  themselves.  As noted  above,  the  decline  in housing
subsidies  (by  far the  largest  individual  component  part  of  national  economy  expenditures)  on
21  The simnilar  coefficient  of variation for budget health expenditures  in 1994 amounted to 0.80, and for
education expenditures,  0.92 (Stewart, 1995).  It is worth noting that Russian annual budget laws, as a  rule,
determine some types of budget expenditures  as protected,  which requires regional governments  to give them
some priority  in budgetary  allocations. A larger  part of overall  budget social  spending  falls under the definition  of
such protected  expenditures. While de facto the federal government  does not have real power to force regional
governments  to follow such established priorities, it appears that regional administrations  are quite keen on
prioritizing  their social  liabilities  versus those in the area of national expenditures.17
average across the Russian Federation from  1993 to  1995 was slightly less than the  average
decline in national economy expenditures.  But in this same period, the coefficient of variation of
this spending jumped from 1993 to  1994, and then came down slightly from  1994 to  1995 at
which point it was still higher than the  1993 level.  This means that the national average for
housing expenditures viewed over time is relatively more 'hnisleading"  than,  say, the national
average for agricultural subsidies, because it conceals greater variation in the individual regions.
This suggests the greater discretion that regions have in subsidizing housing in Russia.
In sharp contrast to housing and other categories, subsidies to  agriculture show relatively
low variability from a static point of view (as evidenced by low coefficients of variability in each
year),  which  in  the  dynamic context  indicates a  stability in  the  distribution  of  agricultural
subsidies across regions, suggesting their low susceptibility to  forces of change.  This indicates
the  existence  across  the  country  of  entrenched  interests  which  have  been  successful  at
maintaining a stable path of support  for agriculture--the sector that has resisted reforms more
successfully  than any other sector in the Russian economy.
The categories 'Other sectors" (1993 and 1994) and 'Industry" (1995) also show a large
jump from 1993 to 1994 which is continued on into 1995. Recall that real per capita spending on
these sectors  dropped by 59% from  1993 to  1995; the ever-increasing coefficient of variation
suggests  that  it  has  not  been the  relatively high-spending regions  who  have brought  their
expenditures down towards  the  average but  rather,  that  the  average  national drop  has been
caused by  expenditures in  the  majority of  the  regions  that  were  average  or  below-average
spenders before.
The  extremely high  coefficient  of variation  in  subsidies to  food  producers  in  1994
represents the "dying  gasps" of this sort of subsidies: as more and more regions phased out price
controls and stopped providing these subsidies, a few persisted in supporting the prices of basic
foodstuffs, and therefore the real range of subsidies was great (Berkowitz et al., 1996).
Budget loans demonstrate a high initial degree of variability that increases greatly over the
period  at  the  same time  that  the  per  capita  average  for  budget  loans  remained  intact,  in
opposition to the general trend.  The large coefficients of variation reflect the extremely high pei
capita expenditures of this sort (and, to  a lesser degree, on investment) that characterizes some
small, autonomous  regions  in Russia.  If the  Chukotsky,  Koryaksky  and  Yamalo-Nenetsky
autonomous regions are removed from the analysis, the coefficients of variation for the years
1992-1995 change to  1.53, 1.37, 0.93  and  0.99 respectively, which  shows the  reverse trend
towards equalization across most of Russia's regions.
Table  6  also  provides  some  important  insights  into the  patterns  with  which  federal
transfers to  regions  are allocated.  The variation in pre-transfer regional revenue  and federal
transfer revenue follows the same pattern over the years, although the relative starting points are
somewhat different.  In both cases, the coefficients of variation show a large drop from 1992 to
1993 (thus, a move towards equalization) and then increase in 1994 to the levels similar to those
in 1992.  But in and of themselves, these two parts of total  revenue say nothing about how the18
federal transfers to regions are distributed, that is, whether truly needy regions receive them.  For
this, the coefficient of variation for total regional revenue is the better  guide.  It, too,  shows a
large drop from  1992 to  1993, an even larger increase in  1994 and some decline in  1995, at
which point it is not much different from its 1992 level.
The comparison  of the  coefficients of variation  for  pre-transfer  and  total  (i.e.  post-
transfer) revenues reflects the degree of equalization effected by the federal transfers. It indicates
that in two years, 1993 and 1995, an only slight move towards equalization resulted from federal
transfers,  while in  1992  and  1994 transfers  were  counter-equalizing--cross-regional budget
inequality was greater after the allocation of transfers than before.
Tables 7 and 8 present the regions with the largest and lowest subsidy levels as reflected
by their reported budget expenditures on national economy and on housing.  The variation is
striking. Even  when  controlling for  most  of  the  differences associated  with  regional  price
variation, the differential between the top and bottom regions amounts to 900%, while shares of
budget expenditure spent on national economy varied from  14% to  61% of the total  in 1995.
The tables suggest that among regions with the lowest subsidy spending one could find a number
of regions which are the most rural as measured both by the share of rural population and the role
of agriculture in the local economy.  At the same time, most regions which are at the top of the
list are the most urbanized and industrially developed territories.
V. Impact of Federal Budget Transfers on Regional Subsidy Spending: Regression Results
This section focuses on the analysis of the impact of federal budget transfers on regional
budgetary policy. What we are trying to clarify here is how, if at all, the federal money influences
regional  governments'  relative  expenditure  preferences,  and  on  what  purposes,  given  the
fungibility of  money, federally transfers  have  been  spent.  We  address  these  questions  by
analyzing  three types of links: (i) between the levels of per capita federal transfers and per capita
regional spending on subsidies; (ii) between the share of federal transfers in total regional budget
financing and  the  level  of regional  subsidy spending, and  (iii) between the  level  of  federal
transfers and the share of subsidy spending in total regional expenditures.
Before discussing the regression results, two general principles which have been used for
designing  these simple statistical models merit mention.
*  Controlling for income variation.  Given the large cross-regional disparity in incomes and the
positive  elasticity  of  most  public expenditures  relative to  income,  it  was  expected  that
variables  reflecting variation  in  regional  income  would  be  highly significant and  could
interfere with the influence of other factors, including that of federal transfers. Thus, to obtain
accurate  estimates of the  impact of  other factors  it  was  decided  to  control  for  income
variation (measured by own (pre-transfer) budget revenues).19
*  No weighting.  Despite the fact that Russian regions vary substantially by size and economic
potential, the analysis below does not attempt to eliminate these scale differences by any type
of regional weights.  Instead, the underlying assumption of the models was that all regional
governments  are similar independent decision-making units  which determine their  budget
expenditure allocations according  to  the  combined  local  impact of  identical supply  and
demand factors.
V.1.  Relationship between the level of received transfers and the amount of subsidy spending.
In all years, a high degree of the variation in total national economy expenditures and in
their  major  components  can be  explained by two  variables  on  the  supply  side: pre-transfer
regional revenue and received federal transfers.  This means that fiscally wealthier regions and
regions receiving more federal transfers spent more on national economy items.  Table 9 gives B
coefficients, t-stats, constants and adjusted P2 values for the two-variable regressions in each year
for the total national economy expenditures 22.
Table  9.  National  Economy  Regression  Results,  Primary  Supply  Factors,  1992-95  (OLS
estimates here and in allfollawing  tables, t-stats are in brackets)
1992*  1993  1994  1995**
(N=86)  (N=87)  (N=87)  (N=86)
Pre-transfer  regional  .368  .389  .396  .440
revenue  (27.9)  (21.5)  (21.2)  (29.5)
Federal transfers  .1364  .2846  .362  .308
(7.7)  (14.9)  (20.2)  (12.0)
Constant  34.3  36.07  -43.4  -30.8
9??  (1.2)  (-1.5)  (-1.6)
AdjustedR2 .91  .87  .92  .93
*Excluding  Koryaksky  AO.
"*Here  and in the  following  tables,  Bashkortostan  not included  due  to non-receipt  of transfers  in 1995.
The  results  in  Table  9  could  be  expected  to  some  extent  from  both  statistical  and
substantive considerations.  On  the  statistical  side,  it  did  not  come  as  a  surprise that  the
correlation  between the  level  of pre-transfer  revenues and  the  level of  expenditures  on  the
national economy is very  strong, because of  some  degree  of collinearity in these indicators.
Given that regional budgets are balanced on the basis of cash (i.e., total revenues are very close
to  total expenditures for all years and all regions), and both pre-transfer revenues and national
economy  expenditures  constitute  a  substantial  portion  of  total  revenues  and  expenditures
respectively, it should be expected that these two indicators are correlated.  The real news here is
that, when controlled for variation in pre-transfer revenues, there is a strong positive correlation
between the levels of federal transfers and regional subsidization.
It is also not very surprising to see that the correlation between these variables is positive.
22  In this and other tables  outliers  have been defined  as those regions  whose inclusion  causes  the coefficient
of variation  to rise above  2.0, and they have  been excluded  in all regressions.Sheetl
Table 7. Regions with highest and lowest shares of budget subsidies per capita. Data from 1995 budgets, in 1991 rubIes.
Lowest shares of Nat. economy expenditures  Highest shares of Nat.  economy expenditures
1 Taymyrskiy  AO  13.88  1 Moskovskaya oblast  61.06
2 Nenetskiy AO  19.80  2 Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO  54.75
3 Aginskiy Buryatskiy AO  21.34  3 Kamchatskaya oblast  54.46
4 Komi-Permyatskaya AO  23.05  4 Khabarovskiy krai  49.69
5 Tuva republic  23.15  5 Yamalo-Nenetskaya rep.  49.61
6 Adygeya republic  23.35  6 Magadanskaya oblast  48.66
7 Chitinskaya oblast  23.76  7 Tatarstan  republic  48.24
8 Gorniy Altay republic  23.82  8 Primorskiy  krai  47.21  _  _
9 Kalmykia republic  24.54  9 St.  Petersburg  46.23  ___  _
10 Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat. AO  25.09  10 Moscow  45.91
Lowest shares of Housing expenditures  Highest shares of Housing expenditures
1 Komi-Permyatskaya AO  8.76  1 Moskovskaya oblast  49.12
2 Nenetskiy AO  9.36  2 Yamalo-Nenetskaya rep.  41.29  _____
3 Taymyrskiy  AO  10.51  3 Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO  40.07  _  __
4 Kalmykia republic  11.99  4 Leningradskaya oblast  36.14
5 Mordovia republic  12.64  5 Evenkiyskiy AO  36.10 _  __  _
6 Novosibirskaya  oblast  12.76  6 Moscow  34.50
7 Chitinskaya oblast  13.19  7 Buryatia republic  32.31
8 Aginskiy Buryatskiy AO  13.31  8 Komi republic  32.30  ___  _
9 Tuva  republic  13.55  9  Primorskiy  krai  31.07  _
10 Adygeya  republic  13.92  10 Kostromskaya  oblast  30.88Sheet2
Table 8. Regions with highest and lowest levels of budget subsidies per capita. Data from 1995 budgets, in 1991 rubles
Lowest levels of Nat. economy expenditures  Highest levels of Nat. economy expenditures
1 Aginskiy Buryatskiy AO  75.97  1 Magadanskaya oblast  2860.78
2 Adygeya republic  94.64  2 St.Petersburg  2104.11
3 Kalmykia  republic  95.94  3 Chukotskaya  AO  1934.57
4 Chitinskaya oblast  123.96  4 Evenkiyskiy AO  1566.02
5 Northern Osetia rep.  125.01  5 Moskovskaya oblast  1403.18
6 Dagestan republic  125.17  6 Yamalo-Nenetskaya rep.  1278.93
7 Mordovia republic  141.75  7 Koryakskiy auton. okrug  1201.57 ___
8 Vladimirskaya oblast  145.87  8 Sakha (Yakutia) republic  1157.37 ___
9 Ust-Ordynskiy Buryat.  AO  149.79  9 Komi republic  701.09
10 Komi-PeTmyatskaya  AO  153.09  10 Tyumenskaya oblast  695.51  _
Lowest levels of Housing expenditures  Highest levels of Housing expenditures  _  ___
1 Kalmykia republic  46.85  1 Evenkiyskiy AO  1410.31
2 Aginskiy Buryatskiy AO  47.38  2 Chukotskaya AO  _  1369.66
3 Adygeya republic  56.41  3 Moskovskaya oblast  1128.76
4 Komi-Permyatskaya AO  58.20  4 St.Petersburg  _  1124.17
5 Mordovia republic  62.00  5 Yamalo-Nenetskaya rep.  1064.47
6 Chitinskaya oblast  68.84  6 Magadanskaya oblast  1050.71
7 Dagestan republic  75.04  7 Koryakskiy auton. okrug  955.90
8 Northern Osetia rep.  77.76  8 Komi republic  533.3651
9 Tambovskaya oblast  78.56  9 Sakha (Yakutia) republic  500.70
10 Kirovskaya oblast  84.13  10 Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO  436.2620
There is no reason to think that regional expenditures on subsidies should have a negative income
elasticity, and therefore, with more funds being available (as measured by an increase in both pre-
transfer revenues and transfers), budget subsidy spending should be expected to grow.  However,
this  consideration does not  explain why such an elasticity is in fact  so high and  substantially
exceeds the similar income elasticity for social budget expenditures (see also Stewart, 1995).
The increase in transfers'  contribution to  national economy expenditures from 1992 to
1993, and then again from 1993 to  1994 (evidenced by the increase in the I3 coefficients) should
be  interpreted to  mean that  in  1994 a much larger portion  of every ruble granted  in federal
transfers to regions was spent by recipients for funding various subsidies. In both absolute terms
and relative to the contribution made by pre-transfer revenue, transfers'  contribution is greatest in
1994. In  1994, regions  received in federal transfers  Rb  276  per  capita  (in  1991 prices) on
average.  The  regression  suggests  that  such  a  level  of  transfers  led  to  national  economy
expenditures amounting to about Rb 100 per  capita (0.362*276), which constitutes 18% of the
average regional spending for this  purpose.  The growing  relative contribution of transfers  in
1992-94 helps provide more insights into the trends in total national economy spending over the
period.  In particular, even though pre-transfer revenues fell in 1994 by 12.1%, the impact of this
fall on national economy spending was  a more  moderate decline of  9.6%  due  to  the larger
compensatory role of increased federal transfers.  Federal transfer contribution fell in  1995 to
compare to 1994 but it still remained higher than in 1992-93.
Tables 10 and  11 show B coefficients from the two-variable regressions similar to  that
one presented in Table 9 for the whole sample of indicators of local subsidy spending -- national
economy and its component accounts, total investment and budget loans.  Taken together they
demonstrate the relative dynamics of these two major determinants of expenditures in the years
1992-1995 when there is no control for other factors.
Of these two  independent variables, pre-transfer revenue made a much larger absolute
contribution in all years, although its relative position varies and is at its weakest in 1994. The
contribution of  federal transfers  relative to  pre-transfer  revenue grows  from  1992 to  1994,
dropping slightly in 1995.
Of the various components of national economy expenditures, housing receives the lion's
share of the  contributions of both  pre-transfer revenue and transfers,  absorbing almost all of
transfers' contributions to national economy expenditures by 1995, which means that in that year
transfers had next to no effect on subsidies to agriculture and transportation.  However, federal
transfers  were  significant determinants  (when  controlled  for  variation  in  own  revenues)  of
expenditures on other industries (in 1993-95), agriculture (1993-94), transportation (1994), food
(1994) and of investment spending (in 1992-94).21
Table 10. 13  coefficientsfor  Pre-Transfer Regional Revenue, 1992-1995 (significant results)
1992  1993  1994  1995
National economy (total)  (N=86)  (N=87)  (N=87)  (N=86)
368  . 389  .396  .440
Housing  n.a.  (N=87)  (N=87)  (N=86)
.270  .259  .217
Agriculture  (N=87)  (N=87)  (N=86)
n.a.  --  .015  .013
Transportation  n.a.  (N=83)  (N-85)  (N=85)
.026  .022  .030
Other (93/94)/Industry (95)  n.a.  (N=86)  (N=86)  (N=85)
.074  .093  .107
Food  (N=86)  (N=84)  (N=65)
.011  .010  .005  n.a.
Total investment  (N=86)  (N=86)  (N=87)  (N=78)
.125  .153  .157  .199
Budget loans  (N=46)  (N=63)  (N=67)  (N=73)
.04  .033  --  .060
"n.a."  means  "not applicable.  ".--"  means results  were not significant.
Table 11. 13  Coefficients for  Federal Transfers, 1992-1995 (significant results)
1992  1993  1994  1995
National economy (total)  .136  .284  .362  .308
Housing  n.a.  .240  .295  .298
Agriculture  n.a.  .02  .015  --
Transportation  n.a.  --  .008  -.012
Other (93/94)MIndustry  (95)  n.a.  .025  .038  .040
Food  --  --  .003  n.a.
Total investment  .054  .063  .031  --
Budget loans  --  --  --
"n.a."  means  'hot applicable."  " -" means results  were not significant. The number  of observations  is the same  as
in corresponding  regressions  in Table 10.22
The statistical results  in  this  section  suggest that  federal transfers  have a  significant
negative impact on regional economic policies. A substantial portion of federal funds (30-40% of
all disbursed transfers) is spent by the recipients on financing various local subsidy programs,
primarily in housing.  In this respect, the existing mechanisms of  transfer allocation seems to be
quite harmful for the reform process: they help regional governments to  delay restructuring in
their expenditure policy and thus delay implementation of major structural reforms  promoted by
the federal government.
At the same time, given the  existing structure  of federal transfer programs,  one could
expect that  the correlation between  federal transfers  and regional  expenditure on  agriculture
would be much stronger  and the contribution of federal transfers in determining the  level of
agricultural expenditure would be much larger than those we found.  The federal government has
continued to run substantial (and quite inefficient) subsidy programs in agriculture (Mudahar and
Sahota, 1996), which are funded by direct federal transfers to  regional budgets through the so-
called system of 'inutual settlements".  De jure,  the mutual settlements constitute the categorical
transfers that  are  supposed to  be  spent by recipients on  purposes determined by  the federal
government.  However, defacto,  the programs are fully administered by regional governments,
as federal authorities have been exercising very little supervision over  actual use of disbursed
funds.
In particular, the program of agricultural subsidies is the largest  single item of mutual
settlement flows, and it amounted to Rb 3.5 trln or 0.55% of GDP in 1994.23 This constituted
15.5% of the overall amount of federal transfers to regions and amounted to 54% of the reported
regional budget  expenditures on agriculture.  Thus, one  could expect  that  the  level of total
federal transfers to regions would have a substantial impact on their agricultural spending, and
the corresponding 13  coefficients in the Table 11 would be close to  0.08 (15.5*.054). That is, 8
kopecks of every ruble received in federal transfers would be spent on agriculture.  In fact, the
actual coefficient is much smaller -- 0.015  in 1994.  Overall, the influence of the federal transfers
and other economic indicators on agricultural expenditure is quite marginal (see below).  Actual
agricultural spending is  substantially different from the  amounts of received federal transfers
designated for agricultural subsidies. In many regions, actual spending on the sector is more than
twice higher than the amount of transfers, while 24 regions spent on agriculture less than they
received through  targeted agricultural transfers,  i.e. they redistributed federal money to  other
purposes according to their expenditure preferences.
The example of federal transfers targeted for agriculture demonstrates another deficiency
of the existing system of federal transfers.  The system not only prevents from a much needed
acceleration in regional reforms, but it did not help the federal government to  protect  its own
expenditure priorities either.
The overall picture regarding the impact of the federal transfers is very unfavorable for
the federal government.  While transfers to regions are quite expensive and remain one of the
23  1994  is the only year for which we have access  to the very detailed  data on the structure  of the federal
programs  funded  through the mechanism  of the mutual  settlements.23
major  expenditure. items  in  the  federal  budget,  the  federal  government  managed  to  "buy"
surprisingly little with this money. At the same time, regional governments, despite their heavy
dependence on federal assistance, face neither serious pressure for fiscal adjustment nor efficient
control  over  the  use  of received funds.  This  provides  additional arguments  for  the  earlier
proposal that due to its scale and low efficiency, substantial cuts in the overall size of the federal
transfer program should be desirable and such cuts are in fact a major potential source of federal
budget savings (Dmitriev, 1996).
V.2. Dependence on federal transfers and regional subsidies.
In this section we measure the impact of the overall dependence on federal transfers on
the regional propensity to subsidize.  While the results in the previous section suggest that the
absolute per capita level of received transfers is an important determinant of  subsidization, it
seems justifiable to expand the analysis in order to explore the role of the relative importance of
federal transfers as a source of funding for regional governments.  We consider the ratio of total
federal transfers and total regional budget expenditures as an indicator of regional dependence on
federal transfers. This indicator was used in two-factor regressions similar to those presented in
Tables 10 and 11. Thus, the impact of regional dependence was measured in the same way as in
the previous section, when variation in own (pre-transfer) regional revenues is controlled for.
On  average,  Russian  regions  funded  from  federal  transfers  13-14%  of  their  total
expenditures in  1992-93 and in  1995.  In  1994, this share jumped  to  about 20%.  However,
beyond these average numbers, the variation in the dependence level is high.  For example, in
1994 while eight regions received in transfers amounts less than 10% of their total expenditures,
the 15 most dependent regions funded more than half of their expenditures with transfers.
Table 12 below contains significant results only.  They suggest that regional dependence
on federal support is also a substantial determinant of the regional expenditure policy with the
structure of significant links similar to  those in Table 11.  Among particular subsidy indicators,
the link is quite sustainable for housing subsidies and expenditures on 'bther industries", and also
for total  investments (for  1992-94).  It  is worth mentioning that  quantitatively the impact of
federal transfers in these regressions is quite large.  Let us consider 1994, when the impact was
the most profound.  For the average Russian region, federal transfers provided funding for about
20% of total regional expenditures.  According to the regression, an increase in this share up to
40% would result in the growth of national economy spending by 208 (20* 10.4) ruble per capita
(in 1991 prices), which constitutes 35% of the average level of regional spending on national
economy in 1994.
Again, the results seem to  indicate that the federal transfer policy in Russia has quite a
negative impact on the reform process at the regional level.  More dependent regions tend to
spend more on subsidies, which means that the main beneficiaries of federal transfers are those
regions  which  (when the  impact of  income  variation is  eliminated) have  a  higher  level of
subsidization and therefore those which have a slower rate of reform and less compliance with
federal economic policies.  The federal government eventually encourages 'bad performers" with24
relatively more transfers, and therefore creates perverse incentives for regional governments.
This result is unexpected when evaluated based on common sense: it seems controversial
for the federal government to run a major budget program whose major beneficiaries are the main
offenders of the federal policy.  At the  same time,  the  results  seems to  be  similar to  those
received by Treisman (1997):  the allocation  of federal transfers  in Russia  is heavily biased
towards the regions which are in deep political confrontation with the federal government.  The
main recipients of federal funds are the most politically conservative regions. Because political
conservatism in Russia  is closely related with  conservative economic policies, then it is  less
surprising that we found transfers being concentrated in regions with extensive subsidy programs.
The concentration of transfers in regions with the most distortive policies could increase
potential  gains  for the  reform process  through  the  introduction  of  conditionality in  federal
transfer mechanisms. More dependent regions could not afford to lose federal transfers, and thus
it may be expected that such regions could become more sensitive to federal guidance and could
be eager to adjust their policies if non-compliance were to carry the risk of a fiscal loss.
Table 12. /-Coefficients for  the Variable "Total Federal Transfers as Percent of Total Regional
Expenditures". Controlledfor  the level of pre-transfer budget revenues.  Significant results only.
1992  1993  1994  1995
National Economy (total)  4.071  7.05  10.40  4.46
Housing  n.a.  5.52  8.01  3.59
Agriculture  n.  a.  --  --  --
Transportation  n.a.  --  --  -0.369
Other (93/94)/Industry (95)  n.a.  1.22  1.79  1.56
Food  --  --  0.113  n.  a.
Total Investments  2.04  2.27  1.46  --
Budget Loans  --  --  2.68  4.09
V.3. Impact of federal transfers on the structure of regional budget spending.
This  section  addresses  the  question  which  could  be  considered  symmetrical to  the
problem in the section V.2:  what is the impact of the level of federal transfers on the share of
subsidies in total  regional expenditures?  Again, we  control for  the variation in own budget
revenues.
The results for this set of regressions are presented in Table 13.  They suggest that the
level of transfers has a sustainable negative impact on the shares of  the following expenditure
items: agriculture,  transportation,  and investments. The  share  of  housing  expenditure is not
correlated with the level of transfers received, and for the total expenditures on national economy
a statistically significant  impact could be identified only for 1992-93.25
Table 13. /Coefficients  for  the Variable "Per Capita Level of Total Federal Transfers ", in
thousands of Rbl.  Independent variables: shares of corresponding expenditures items in total
expenditures.  Controlledfor  the level ofpre-transfer  budget revenues.  Significant results only.
1992  1993  1994  1995
National Economy (total)  -3.80  -3.75  --  --
Housing  n.a.  --  --  --
Agriculture  n.a.  -1.32  -0.781  -2.00
Transportation  n.a.  -1.38  -0.440  -1.77
Other (93/94)/Industry (95)  n.a.  -1.40  --  --
Food  --  --  --  n.a.
Total Investments  --  -1.82  -1.000  -2.96
Budget Loans  --  --  0.712  5.84
The negative sign for the corresponding coefficients should be interpreted to  mean that
the share of transfers spent on subsidies is smaller than the share of own regional revenues spent
on  these purposes.  Federal transfers  are  partially spent  on  subsidization  and  therefore  they
expand the overall amount of regional expenditures on subsidies (positive regression coefficients
in  Table  11).  However,  when  recipients  allocate  transfers  between  various  expenditure
categories, they spend relatively less on subsidies than when they spend their own budget money
(pre-transfer revenues).
At the same time, the quantitative effect of such a negative correlation is relatively weak.
In  1993, federal  transfers of  Rbl  1000 per  capita would  reduce  the  share  on  total  regional
expenditures spent on national economy by less than 4%. The actual average federal transfer in
1993 amounted to  Rbl  220 per  capita, i.e. it could decrease the share by less than  1% in  a
situation where the average region spent 44% of its expenditures on national economy.
VI. Other Determinants of Regional Subsidy Spending
This  section  provides  further  analysis  of  subsidy  determinants  using  multivariate
regressions.  In what follows, we expand the two-factor regressions reflected in Tables 9-11 to
explore the impact of various demand and supply factors listed in section III.  Tables 14-21 show
results only for significant  variables.
VI. 1. National Economy
Multivariate regressions for each year as described in Table  14 below tell a story very
similar to those  in Table 9.  Few demand factors prove to  be significant in the different years
under analysis; in all years by far the most significant explanatory variables remain pre-transfer
regional revenue and federal transfer revenue. Moreover, demand, or need, factors (such as per26
worker wage arrears)  tend to show  inverse  relations,  as evidenced  by the negative  value of the 13
coefficients. This is the logical  complement  of the direct  relationship  of the supply-side  factors:
the presence of greater need in a region tends to  lead to  a reduction in national economy
expenditures,  not the increase  one might expect  to meet those  needs.
Table 14. National Economy Expenditures, Multivariable Regression Results, 1992-95
1992*  1993  1994  1995
(N=86)  (N=78)  (N=78)  (N=86)
Pre-transfer  regional  .367  .351  .386  .391
revenue  (28.4)  (10.6)  (16.3)  (22.4)
Federal  transfers  .140  .269  .293  .244
(8.1)  (8.5)  (16.2)  (8.9)
Household incomes  .030  .030  .022
(2.5)  (4.1)  (4.4)
Doctors per 10,000  3.32  3.66
(2.2)  (3.2)
Wage arrears (1993 data)  -.311  -.449
(-2.0)  (-3.4)
Constant  -104.6  4.44  -230.47  -81.0
(-1.6)  (.16)  (-4.8)  (-3.9)
Adjusted  R 2 .92  .86  .96  .94
*Excluding  Koryaksky  AO.
The most obvious  observation  from Table 14 is that the inclusion  of additional  variables
in the regressions  does not unambiguously  improve  their explanatory  force relative  to the two-
variable  regressions  in Table  9, as indicated  by the adjusted  R2  values. 25
Of note in both Tables 9 and 14 is the stability  of pre-transfer  regional revenues as a
determinant  of national  economy  expenditures,  as demonstrated  by the  3 coefficients:  holding  all
else constant, for every extra 1991 ruble of pre-transfer  revenue, regions spent an additional
0.37-0.44  rubles  on  national economy  expenditures  in  the  period  1992-95  in  the  Table  9
regressions,  and analogously,  0.35-0.39  rubles  in the Table 14 regressions.
VI.2. Housing
The explanatory  power of the two-variable  regressions  used to explain  overall national
24  In order to  effect the transition from the two-variable  regressions  in  Table 9 to  the multivariable
regressions  in Table 14, all of the independent  variables  under examination  were added one at a time to the two-
variable regressions. Significant  results for the third variable then led to that variable being used in a three-
variable regression,  to which fourth variables were added one at a time, and so on.  This process  was stopped
when  no addition  of an independent  variable  resulted  in significant  results  for that variable.
25  For some  of the independent  variables  in the Table 14 regressions  data were not available  for all regions,
leading to the drop in both the number  of observation  (N) and the adjusted  R 2 in 1993  in the Table 14 regressions
relative  to Table 9.27
economy  expenditures  varies  greatly  when  the  component  parts  of  national  economy
expenditures are exarnined.  Following in each section are the regressions that had the highest
explanatory force as measured by the adjusted R2 values.
In all years on average in the Russian Federation, subsidies to housing constituted by far
the single largest portion of national economy expenditures, accounting for between 56% and
65% of expenditures in the years  1993-95 (data for the national economy components are not
available for 1992 with the exception of food subsidies.) For this reason, it is to be expected that
the regression results for housing largely reflect those for overall national economy expenditures.
Table  15 reflects the regressive character  of housing subsidies in Russia:  residents in
wealthier regions  received more in  housing  subsidies 26. Also, as  indicated by  the  variable
'Doctors  per  10,000" (generally, a  proxy for  urbanization) in  all years,  the  most  urbanized
regions (not necessarily the wealthiest) also received more in housing subsidies.  The same result
is reflected in the negative coefficient for the variable 'Rural  population" in  1993. The latter
reflects another dimension of inequality in housing subsidy allocation: most housing subsidies are
provided by local goverrnents  through subsidized rates on centralized delivery of heating and
hot water, which is a predominantly urban phenomenon.  Rural households do not have access to
these utilities and, hence, do not receive the subsidies associated with them.
Table 15. Determinants of Housing Subsidies, 1993-95
1993  1994  1995
(N=87)  (N=78)  (N=86)
Pre-transfer regional  .264  .116  .161
revenue  (14.4)  (4.5)  (10.0)
Federal transfers  .231  .245  .217
(12.0)  (11.9)  (8.6)
Household income  .065  .024
(8.5)  (5.3)
Wage arrears (1993 data)  -.572
(-4.0)
Doctors per 10,000  7.69  3.28  3.54
(4.5)  (2.5)  (2.8)
Share of rural population (1994 data)  -3.11
(-3.3)
Constant  -418.6  -178.1  -209.8
(-5.5)  (-3.3)  (-3.9)
AdjustedR2 .80  .93  .87
26  Freund  and Wallich  (1995)  show that in a similar situation  in Poland the top income  quintile  of
households  spent  more  than  five  times  as much  on fuel  as the  bottom  quintile.  Hence,  price  controls  in the  energy
sector  are regressive  and involve  a lot of  "leakage"  of the  price  subsidy  to the  non-poor.28
Additionally,  federal  transfers  are  strongly  correlated  with  the  level  of  housing
subsidization: in the  years  1993-95, 22-25%  of  the average  incremental federal transfers  to
regions were spent on additional subsidization of the housing sector. Table 15 demonstrates the
high (relative to other factors) and stable contribution of transfers to housing subsidies. Holding
all else constant, from 1993 to  1994 the contribution of pre-transfer regional revenue to housing
subsidies dropped from 26 to  12 kopecks for every additional ruble of  such revenue (recall that
in the same period the coefficient of variation increased from 0.99 to  1.39), increasing to  16
kopecks in 1995 (when the coefficient of variation decreased to  1.14.)  At the same time, the
contribution of federal transfers to housing subsidies was stable with 22-25 kopecks for every
additional ruble of transfers.
The close link between federal transfers and  local housing subsidies creates favorable
conditions for  a  more  active federal government  policy towards  increased cost  recovery  in
housing.  In particular, it suggests that the GOR might consider introducing a minimum cost
recovery level in housing as a primary condition for receiving equalization transfers.  This might
be seen as a sort of 'Win-win"  strategy: regional governments either will implement measures to
increase cost recovery on their own in order to gain access to federal grants or, if they decline to
do so, they will receive less in transfers, which, as the regression results suggest, ultimately will
lead to a decrease in housing subsidies because of general fiscal constraints.
VI.3. Agriculture
In  1993-95 subsidies to  agriculture  accounted  for  a  stable  15%  of  overall  national
economy expenditures. Given the relatively small weight of agricultural subsidies in the total, it is
not surprising that agricultural subsidies were less successfully explained by the combination of
pre-transfer revenue and transfers than housing subsidies. However, it was not expected that the
drop in the explained variation would be so large.  In particular, the values of the  R2  in the
regressions  for  agriculture are  much lower  than  in  regressions for  transportation  and  other
industry subsidies, which constitute smaller components of the total  expenditures on national
economy. At the same time, as we will see in another section below, expenditures on agriculture
are heavily autocorrelated from one year to  the next, which together with their low variation
suggests a high degree of uniformity in expenditure trends in this sector across Russia.  Such
uniformity could be interpreted to mean that factors beyond the scope of our analysis are more
important in determining regional budget expenditures on agriculture, such as the vested interests
that have resisted agricultural reform in Russia.  In contrast to other kinds of regional subsidies,
especially housing subsidies, in multivariate models the level of regional agricultural expenditures
is  almost  independent  from  the  federal  transfers  provided. 27 This  link  is  not  statistically
significant despite the fact that  some  federal transfer programs  are targeted  at  provision of
subsidies to farmers.
This means that the federal government has much less leverage over reductions in the
27  In 1995  the relationship  is significant  but it is an inverse  relationship.  Holding  constant  the other
independent  variables,  for every  extra ruble received  in federal transfers  in  1995, subsidies  to agriculture
decreased  by  0.03  rubles.29
scale of regional intervention in this sector: on average regional governments do not  intend to
reduce  agricultural  support  in  response  to  simple  cuts  in  federal  transfers.  The  federal
government will need to use a more comprehensive policy to influence regional decision-makers
to reform their agriculture policy. One of the components of such a policy should be the redesign
of the existing federal transfers for agricultural subsidies.  Such subsidies and therefore transfers
must be eliminated. If the federal government wants to continue the provision of support for the
sector, it  should, first,  switch  such assistance to  less distortive types  of  interventions 28,  and,
second, set up monitoring mechanisms to ensure that corresponding transfers are actually spent
on the designated purposes of agricultural or rural development and can not be reallocated by
regional governments.
Table 16. Determinants of Subsidies to Agriculture, 1993-95
1993  1994  1995
(N=78)  (N=78)  (N=77)
Pre-transfer regional revenue  .045  .042  .065
(2.75)  (5.3)  (6.8)
Federal transfers  -.028
(-3.3)
Unemployment level  -6.97  -4.28  -4.81
(-1.7)  (-2.2)  (-3.7)
Share of rural population,  1.79  1.51  1.36
1994 data  (2.8)  (4.2)  (4.8)
Constant  43.61  33.4  15.3
(1.0)  (1.4)  (0.9)
Adjusted R2 .14  .35  .48
Table  16 demonstrates  the familiar positive relationship between pre-transfer  regional
revenue and regional expenditures on subsidies.  Another factor that has a positive influence on
agriculture expenditures is the percentage of people living in rural locations in the region, which
is a  demand factor.  Holding constant the other independent variables in each regression,  for
every 10% increase in the rural population compared to the average level, per capita expenditures
on agriculture went up by 14-18 rubles or by 20% of the average spending on agriculture. The
share of the rural population is the demand factor identified in our analysis which has the most
substantial impact on subsidy financing.
Unemployment, which is similar to wage arrears as an indicator of regional distress (i.e. a
demand factor) and which is so far mainly an urban phenomenon in Russia, shows a negative
relationship: growth in registered unemployment leads to a drop in agriculture subsidies.
29  For instance,  subsidize  public  investments  in rural areas  (in the form of matching  grants) instead  of current
financing  of subsidies  on agricultural  inputs.30
VI.4. "Other sectors" (1993-1994) and Industry (1995)
Table  17. Determinants  of Subsidies  to Other  Industries,  1993-95
1993*  1994**  1995***
(N=86)  (N=86)  (N=85)
Pre-transfer regional  .118  .122  Pre-transfer  .108
revenue  (10.3)  (14.0)  regional  (10.1)
revenue
Federal transfers  .037  Federal  .033
(7.0)  transfers  (2.3)
Household incomes  -.014  -.017
(-3.1)  (-4.5)
School children, per  .677  School children,  .674
1000  (2.6)  per 1000  (2.1)
Share of loss-making  1.85
enterprises, 1994  (3.5)
data
Share of rural  1.45
population, 1994  (3.5)
data
Constant  -70.65  -89.2  Constant  -145.1
(-3.2)  (-2.2)  (??)
Adjusted 12  .69  .84  Adjusted R2  .60
*Excluding  Ulyanovskaya  oblast.  **Excluding  Gornyi  Altay.  ***Excluding  Yamalo-Nenetsky  AO.
Although the two  categories 'Other sectors" and 'Industry" (representing industry,
energy and construction) are not identical, the  analysis of their determinants  reveals some
interesting  similarities.  Primarily  this concerns  the high degree of significance  and the stability  of
the contribution  of pre-transfer  revenue  in determining  expenditures  and the relatively  small  but
significant  role of transfers  in the same  process.
The positive  relationship  in 1994  and 1995  between  the relative  number  of school  children
and subsidies  to industry  reflects the fact that those regions that have high birth rates (notably
some of the Russian autonomous republics) tend to have lower household real incomes and to
experience lower rates of economic reforms, and to allocate higher than average transfers to local
industry.
VI.  5. Transportation
Here, too, federal transfers  are relatively  less successful  in explaining  the allocation  of
subsidies to  the transportation sector, and are  significant  and positive only in  1994.  Not
surprisingly, more urbanized regions tend to spend more on public transportation, as evidenced
by the negative values of the 13  coefficients in all three years for the factor 'Rural population."  In31
1995  the impact  of tranfers  on transportation  subsidies  is negative,  which  is an unique  situation  in
our analysis. 29 Our interpretation  for this is substantial  growth in transportation  subsidies  that
year in regions  less dependent  on federal  transfers,  such  as Moscow  and Saint  Petersburg.
In their level of explanatory  power and the role of the main explanatory  factors (other
than federal transfers),  these regression  results are much closer to those obtained  in the case of
housing  than  those for agriculture. Subsidies  to transportation  are also of a regressive  nature and
discriminate  against  rural households. However, in contrast to housing,  transportation  subsidies
are less  determined  by federal  transfers.
Table  18. Determinants  of Subsidies  to Transportation,  1993-95
1993  1994  1995
(N=83)  (N=77)  (N=86)
Pre-transfer regional revenue  .023  .026  .022
(6.1)  (6.3)  (6.5)
Federal transfers  .023  -.093
(6.8)  (-2.2)
Household incomes  .002
(2.0)
Unemployment level  -2.18
(-2.6)
Share of rural population, 1994  -.477  -.488  -.514
data  (-2.4)  (-3.0)  (-3.1)
Constant  40.5  39.14  31.73
(4.2)  (3.7)  (3.9)
Adjusted  R2 .45  .74  .64
29  The same  effect  was observed  earlier in Tables 11 and 12.32
VI.6. Food Subsidies
Table 19. Determinants of Subsidies to Food Producers, 1992-94
1992*  1993  1994**
(N=86)  (N=84)  (N=62)
Pre-transfer regional  .012  .009  .011
revenue  (4.1)  (3.1)  (6.31)
Federal transfers  .007
(2.79)
Household incomes  -.003
(-5.2)
Unemployment level  -1.34
(-3.7)
Constant  21.5  6.64  11.77
AdjustedR2 .15  .11  .45
*Excluding  Koryaksky  AO. **Excluding  Gomyi  Altay,  Chukotsky  AO,  Yamalo-Nenetsky  AO.
The food subsidies component of national economy expenditures in 1992-93 is the least
explained by the regressions presented in this analysis.  The only variable that  proved  to  be
significant in 1992 and 1993 was pre-transfer revenue, and the overall explanatory power of the
regressions was low.  There is some similarity  between the two sets of regressions estimated for
agricultural and food subsidies.  This should not be treated as simple coincidence: in Russia, food
price subsidies are disbursed directly to producers in food industry, not to the final consumers. As
a  result, the  overall benefits associated with these  subsidies are shared between  two  groups
(households and industry) in an implicit, non-formalized way.  Given the close existing links
between farms and food processing plants, it seems that the same social and political variables
which determine allocation of subsidies to agriculture and which were left beyond the scope of
this study, might be also relevant in explaining  allocation of food subsidies.
It is likely that the incidence of food subsidies follows the scale of locally imposed food
price control.  The latter suggests that one of political determinants of food subsidies should be
related to the personality of the regional governor.  To impose an efficient regional price control
in Russian circumstances requires a strong regional leader capable of suppressing the interests of
local producers and traders to liberalize local markets.  The efficient price control also needs a
strong administrative  machine to prevent both large violations of the price regime and exports of
subsidized commodities outside of the region.  This 'Vtrong leadership" factor explains, in our
view, why even in some very reform-oriented regions with a  strong governor  (e.g.  in Nizhny
Novgorod), the phasing out of the price control has been quite slow (Lavrov, 1996b).
By 1994, when only 68 regions continued to provide some amount (often small) of funds
to food producers in order to restrain increases in retail prices, in addition to pre-transfer revenue
two other variables--unemployment and household incomes--proved to be significant, leading to
a relatively high adjusted R2 value compared to  1992 and 1993.33
VI.7.  Total investments
Table 20. Determinants of Investment Expenditure, 1992-95
1992*  1993  1994  1995
(N=86)  (N=78)  (N=85)  (N=73)
Pre-transfer regional revenue  .125  .162  .147  .146
(10.1)  (11.5)  (16.6)  (5.2)
Federal transfers  .054  .120  .065  .047
(3.3)  (6.3)  (4.6)  (2.0)
Wage arrears (1993)  n.a.  -.533  -.430
(-6.2)  (-4.6)
Real household incomes  .011
(2.4)
Meat production (1994/1991)  -3.26
(-4.0)
Hospital beds, per 10,000 (1993 data)  -1.01
(-2.1)
Life expectancy (1993 data)  7.59
(2.4)
Constant  39.6  21.5  189.4  -529.9
(1.9)  (1.3)  (2.7)  (-2.6)
Adjusted R2 .58  .64  .81  .68
*Excluding  Koryaksky  AO.
In each year, pre-transfer revenue and transfers are significant determinants of investment,
and the relationship between the two is relatively stable.
In 1993 and 1995, wage arrears, a needs factor, demonstrated an inverse relationship with
investment expenditures: in these years, holding constant other variables, every additional 1991
ruble of wage arrears resulted in 0.35 rubles less spent on investment.  Similarly, in 1994, regions
experiencing a greater  decline in meat production (used here as a proxy for overall decline in
agricultural production) also spent less on investment.
Table  20  suggests  that  federal  transfers  to  the  regions  is  a  statistically significant
determinant of regional  budget  investments. While  small in  absolute terms  (a  0.05-0.08  Rb
increase with every ruble increase in federal transfers), Table 20 demonstrates that, even given all
the deficiencies of the federal transfer allocation mechanism, it still provides some equalization
effect--federal transfers  influence positively local, predominantly public, investments, which in
turn are crucial for future economic development.
VI.8.  Budget Loans
Budget loans is a growing type of government assistance to the enterprise sector.  In fact,
in most  cases, such loans are implicit subsidies to  recipients because they are granted  at low,34
usually negative interest rates, and their default rates are extremely high.  In  addition, budget
loans  are  less  transparent  transfers  than  conventional  subsidies. Under  the  current  fiscal
management  system, it  is much  easier  for  regional  governments to  hide  information about
particular recipients of budget funds from both the federal government and the local legislature
when these funds are disbursed as 'budget loans" or 'other expenditures" instead of "expenditure
on a particular sector".
Table 21.  Determinants of Budget Loans, 1992-95
1992  1993  1994*  1995**
(N=46)  (N=59)  (N=63)  (N=79)
Pre-transfer regional  .010  .065  .074
revenue  (7.3)  (6.8)  (9.5)
Federal transfers  .028
(3.1)
Household incomes  -.010  -.012  -.005
(-2.6)  (-3.2)  (-2.0)
Meat production  1.47
(1994/1991)  (2.8)
Wage arrears (1993)  .100
(2.1)
Index of Industrial  .315
Output  (1.7)
Share of loss-making  n.a.  n.a.  -.912
enterprises  (-3.8)
Unemployment level  -2.86
(-2.0)
Constant  6.29  -6.39  51.1  -36.7
(0.6)  (-0.7)  (18.4)  (-2.3)
Adjusted R2 .61  .47  .29  .61
*Excluding  Chukotsky  AO and Koryaksky  AO. **Excluding  Chukotsky  AO.
Pre-transfer revenue was the most significant  determining factor of loans to enterprises in
1992, 1993 and 1995.  The exception to this pattern, 1994, is the year when per capita spending
on loans dropped from 34 to 26, and also the year least successfully explained by the regression
analysis. Transfers are significant  only in 1994.
Note that in 1994, various indicators directly linked to industrial production proved to be
significant  in the determination of loans to enterprises, with better-off regions providing relatively
more in loans than regions that demonstrated greater need.  Thus, the index of industrial output
has a positive effect on loans, while the percentage of loss-making enterprises negatively affects
loans (the two variables are in some sense negative images of  each other.)  Similarly, regions
with higher unemployment spend less on loans to  enterprises. The same effect is seen in 1995:
regions less affected by agricultural decline (measured by the meat production  index) granted
more loans that year.35
VI.9. Autocorrelation coefficients for main variables.
Table 22  shows the  coefficients of  correlation of the  dependent variables--per capita
budget spending on various subsidies--for each year examined in this analysis with the analogous
variable from the preceding year. Those cases where the previous year's  variable is significant
when added to the regression as reported in tables above and increases the adjusted RP  value of
the regression are shown in bold face.  Outliers as identified in the regression analyses above have
been removed from the data.
Table 22.  Coefficients of Correlation with the Previous Year, 1993-1995
1993  1994  1995
National Economy  .825  .910  .884
Housing*  .948  .863
Agriculture*  .639  .771
Other/Industry*  .656  .795
Transportation*  .664  .585
Food  .601  .516  n.a.
Investment  .618  .912  .798
Loans  .455  - .744
* No  correlation  can  be computed  for 1993  in the absence  of a breakdown  for national  economy  expenditures  in
1992.
Many variables show high positive correlations with  the  same type  of variable in the
previous year when examined in isolation, supporting the notion of substantial 'inertia" in the
budget-allocation  process.  And  although  several meet  the  dual criteria  of  significance and
increasing the adjusted RP  value when added to the regression, in most cases the improvement to
the regression results was slight.
That is, expenditures on housing, transportation, other industries are better  explained by
other factors presented in Tables 15, 17 and 18, and one should not make too much of the high
autocorrelation values for these factors as shown in Table 22.
Subsidies to  agriculture are a  noteworthy exception.  In this  case the  addition of the
previous year's  variable in the regressions for 1994 and 1995 reported above in Table 16 led to
that variable's becoming the most significant, and to very large increases in the adjusted RP  values
(from 0.35 to 0.62 in 1994 and from 0.48 to 0.77 in 1995.)  This bespeaks a very high degree of
inertia in the budget-making process for agriculture subsidies, which again confirms this sector's
high resistance to the forces of change in Russia.
Similarly, when  1992  food  expenditures  were  added  to  the  regression  for  1993
expenditures the adjusted P3  value increased from .11 to  .34, confirming the similarities between
agriculture and food subsidies mentioned earlier.36
VII. Conclusions
This analysis has demonstrated the high degree of significance of pre-transfer regional
revenues and federal transfers to regions in explaining national economy expenditures funded by
Russian regions.  To a lesser degree, these two variables also influence investment and, to a lesser
degree yet, loans to  enterprises.  But  federal transfers are particularly weak  in explaining the
variation in loans provided by regions.
The implications of the  significance of these two  supply-side factors is  clear: fiscally
wealthier regions and those regions that receive more in federal transfers have, on average in the
years under examination, spent more on various types of budget subsidies.  While it might seem
that  these two  independent variables are associated with two fundamentally different types of
regions in Russia (the former being the wealthier, the latter being the needier regions) and that,
therefore, a degree of equalization is implicit in the regression results, it should be noted that the
determination of federal transfers to the regions is not a completely transparent process and that
other studies indicate the flawed nature of the formula used to  determine 'heedy" and "very
needy" regions. 30 Indeed,  as  Table  6  demonstrates,  the  comparison  of  the  coefficients of
variation for pre-transfer revenue and for total (i.e., post-transfer) revenue indicates no significant
movement towards equalization in the regions of Russia as a result of federal transfers.
Although the important question of exactly how and in what amounts federal transfers to
the regions are determined is outside the scope of this analysis, it will be recalled that, at least as
far as the total  amount of transfers to the regions is concerned, it is not  a foregone conclusion
that the neediest regions receive the most in transfers.
The analysis also suggests that the demand factors, i.e. indicators of regional need for
government  interventions,  are  not  critical  in  determining  the  level  of  regional  budget
subsidization.  Even when controlling for regional budget wealth, depressed regions (i.e., those
which are more affected by industrial decline, unemployment, etc.) tend to spend less on subsidies
than regions in a more favorable economic situation.  The share of rural population is the demand
factor identified in our analysis which has the most substantial impact on subsidy financing.
Of the various components of national economy expenditures, housing receives the lion's
share  of the contributions of both pre-transfer revenue and transfers,  absorbing almost  all of
transfers'  contributions to  national economy expenditures by 1995, which means that transfers
had next to no effect on subsidies to agriculture, transportation and industry.
Our results represent, in a  sense, average effects across all regions and, therefore,  are
indicators of trends across the country.  But they conceal variation within each variable (such as
are captured by the residuals in the regressions), an important analytical concern best measured
by the coefficient of variation. Most indicators of subsidies show growing inter-regional variation
accompanied by reduction in real per capita spending.  However, these trends  in variation are
quite uneven.  Thus, the variation in housing subsidies is much wider than that in agriculture,
30  See, for example, World Bank (1995), Treisman (1996).37
implying greater disparities in subsidization of housing across Russia and greater uniformity in
subsidies to agriculture.
Coefficients of autocorrelation are useful in providing evidence of inertia in the budget-
making process, when a given year's  spending on a given account is influenced significantly by
the previous year's  level of spending, that is, not solely responsive to conditions existing in that
year.  High autocorrelations exist between a number of like variables in consecutive years.  But
the previous year's variable had a substantially  significant effect on the regression results only as
concerns  subsidies to  agriculture and  food  producers,  suggesting the  particular  relevance of
inertia in the budget-making process in these cases.
The  major  conclusions of  the  study regarding  the  role  of  federal  transfers  may be
presented as following:
- Federal transfers are important determinants of major regional budget subsidies granted to
consumers such as housing and, to a much smaller extent, industrial producers (other subsidies).
Our results confirm that both major types of consumer subsidies (housing, transportation)  are
strongly  counter-equalizing:  wealthier  households  receive  more  in  housing  subsidies  and,
furthermore, rural populations have less access to  these subsidies. Thus, up to 30% of regional
budget expenditures is spent in a questionable manner, at least as concerns the issue of social
equality.  However--what might be even more important--such policies are directly supported by
the federal government through federal transfers.  Over the years 1993-95, up to 30% of every
incremental ruble of federal transfers was spent by regions for housing subsidies.
Federal transfers continue to be a  statistically significant determinant of regional budget
investments, which  in the long term  may have an  important equalization impact on  regional
economic development. However, the incremental impact of transfers on regional investments is
much smaller than in the case of consumer subsidies and it dropped further in 1994-95 compared
to 1992-93.
- Federal transfers are  relatively less important in determining the  regional variation of
producer  subsidies measured  as the volume of  agricultural expenditures,  and the  volume  of
preferential budget loans.  These categories of spending are predominantly determined either by
the regions'  own tax base  and economic wealth (budget loans) or by other factors which, it
seems, reflect the political influence of local interest groups (agriculture, partially food subsidies).
- It  follows  that  in  the  case  of  consumer  subsidies, especially housing,  the  federal
government  is in  a  favorable position to  influence the  acceleration of  sectoral  reforms  and
reductions in local  subsidies. The GOR may consider reduction in  a number of recipients of
federal transfers  and changes in rules  of their allocation.  If the  GOR introduces  conditional
federal transfers  and sets fixed cost  recovery levels in housing and transportation as  a major
conditionality for recipients, then regions will either have to reduce local subsidies in order to get
federal grants, or continue the existing policy of subsidies without receiving federal assistance.
However, in the latter case, as our results suggest, without federal assistance regions ultimately38
will  be forced  to reduce  subsidies  in response  to general  fiscal strains.
- The concentration  of transfers  in regions with the most distortive  policies  could increase
potential gains for the reform process through the  introduction of conditionality  in federal
transfer  mechanisms.  More dependent  regions  could not afford  to lose federal  transfers,  and thus
it may  be expected  that such regions  would  become  more sensitive  to federal  guidance  and would
be eager to adjust their policies  if non-compliance  were to carry  the risk of a fiscal  loss.39
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